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How Muslims understand democracy:  
an empirical investigation 
 
Shireen AlAzzawi1 
Moamen Gouda2 
Abstract 
This study examines how Muslims understand democracy and its essential components. We 
hypothesize that, although Muslims tend to value democracy as high as non-Muslims, Muslims 
have a unique understanding of procedural, as well as substantive, components of democracy, that 
stems from both their historical, and current, socioeconomic experiences. Employing the latest 
data from World Values Survey, our descriptive statistics suggest that while Muslims highly value 
democracy, and believe they don’t have enough of it, their notion of democracy is distinct from 
that of non-Muslims. Muslims tend to associate democracy with its perceived outcomes, and do 
not have a substantial reservation against the interference of the army or religious authorities in 
the governing process. On the other hand, they view procedural aspects of democracy, such as 
elections, civil rights and gender equality, as less essential than their non-Muslim counterparts. 
We use an ordered logit regression model to understand the determinants of preferences for 
democracy and its components, controlling for both individual and macro level variables. Our 
results show that the determinants of Muslims’ attitudes towards democracy and its components, 
are very similar to those of non-Muslims facing similar socioeconomic circumstances or coming 
from the same cultural and historical backgrounds.  
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Introduction 
Scholars have long theorized about what democracy specifically entails. So far, there is no 
consensus among political scientists on how to deﬁne democracy (Knutsen, 2011, p. 46). In fact, 
many scholars argue that democracy is essentially a contested concept (Collier, Hidalgo, & 
Maciuceanu, 2006, p. 222; Crick, 2002, p. 1; Gallie, 1956; Kurki, 2010, p. 362). According to 
Shapiro (1996), political theory hypothesizes that democracy consists of two essential 
components: procedural (rule-centered) and substantive (outcome-centered). Procedural 
democracy institutes a certain set of rules and procedures needed to produce an electorally-
legitimated government. This includes the rights to civil liberties, the right to vote and hold office, 
the right to exercise freedom of speech, majority rules, minority rights, and other elements that 
establishes democratic rule. This is also at times referred to as ‘working democracy’ (Dahl, 1998).  
Procedural democracy is usually defined in a ‘minimalist’ way. For example, Schumpeter (1976) 
defines democracy as the “institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which 
individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote” 
(1976, p. 269). More recently, Przeworski et al. (2000, p. 15) deﬁne democracy simply as a 
political regime in which “those who govern are selected through contested elections”.  
Substantive democracy can be seen as the fruit of procedural democracy. The substantive view 
assesses democracy on the basis of substance of government policies. The direct material gains 
citizens make by taking part in a democratic political process is substantive democracy. Social 
justice, safe working conditions, fair access to opportunity, education, healthcare are all seen as 
the desired distributive outcome of a genuine democratic political process (Nozick, 1977).  
Definitions of substantive democracy tends to be more maximalist, as does Diamond (1999) who 
argues that competitive, multiparty elections are not sufficient for liberal democracy. In fact, 
Diamond (2004) argues that democracy consists of four key elements: (a) A political system for 
choosing and replacing the government through free and fair elections; (b) The active participation 
of the people, as citizens, in politics and civic life; (c) Protection of the human rights of all citizens, 
and (d) A rule of law, in which the laws and procedures apply equally to all citizens. 
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In a recent study, Diamond and Morlino (2005, pp. x-xxxi) propose a set of different components 
of democracy. They distinguish between five procedural dimensions of democratic quality and 
two substantive ones. Their five procedural dimensions are 1) rule of law, 2) participation, 3) 
competition, 4) vertical accountability and 5) horizontal accountability. The two substantive 
dimensions are 6) political equality and 7) civil and political freedoms. The authors also include 
8) responsiveness as a link between the procedural and substantive dimensions. 
The fact that scholars differ in their definitions of democracy demonstrates the challenge of 
adopting one-size-fits-all conceptualizations to represent mass views of democracy (Canache, 
2012). For the past two decades, an increasing number of public opinion surveys have been 
conducted to investigate different conceptions of democracy among the public (Baviskar & 
Malone, 2004; Bratton & Mattes, 2001; Camp, 2001; Ferrín & Kriesi, 2016; Miller, Hesli, & 
Reisinger, 1997; Shin & Cho, 2010; Welzel, 2011). According to Norris (1999), most people 
around the world claim that they would prefer a democratic political system. Muslims are no 
exception. According to Pew Research Center (2012; 2013), Muslims around the world express 
broad support for democracy.  
Even if the level of support for democracy is comparable among Muslims and non-Muslims 
(Norris & Inglehart, 2002), there can be considerable differences in the specific understandings of 
democracy held by people from different religions and societies. For instance, while most 
democratic Western countries acknowledge that state and religion should be separated, the 
majority of Arabs consider democracy compatible with Islamic law (Grant & Tessler, 2002). 
Moreover, 56% of Arab respondents agreed that religious authorities should exert a significant 
influence over government decisions, while 44% disagreed (Jamal & Tessler, 2008). Interestingly, 
there is hardly any study investigating how Muslims understands democracy, as well as its most 
defining components. 
This study examines how Muslims understand democracy and its essential components. We 
hypothesize that, although Muslims tend to value democracy as high as non-Muslims, Muslims 
have a unique understanding of procedural, as well as substantive, components of democracy, that 
stems from both their historical, and current, socioeconomic experiences . Employing the sixth 
wave of World Values Survey, conducted from 2010 to 2014, our descriptive statistics suggest that 
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while Muslims highly value democracy, and believe they don’t have enough of it, their notion of 
democracy is distinct from that of non-Muslims. Muslims tend to associate democracy with its 
perceived outcomes, and do not have a substantial reservation against the interference of the army 
or religious authorities in the governing process. On the other hand, they view procedural aspects 
of democracy, such as elections, civil rights and gender equality, as less essential than their non-
Muslim counterparts.  
Based on the principles of the New Institutional Economics (NIE), we propose that a Muslims’ 
attitudes toward democracy are associated with their existing social, political and economic 
circumstances as well as their historical and cultural contexts. Consequently, we control for macro, 
as well as individual level determinants of the preference for democracy. Using an ordered logit 
regression model, our results show that the determinants of Muslims’ attitudes towards democracy 
and its components, are very similar to those of non-Muslims facing similar socioeconomic 
circumstances or coming from the same cultural and historical backgrounds.  
Moreover, we find that, while religiosity among both Muslims and non-Muslims, is positively 
correlated with higher preference for democracy, it is also positively correlated with preference 
for the intervention of the military and religious authorities in political decision-making. This 
result suggests that religious individuals (of all religions) prefer a unique kind of democracy, where 
democratic procedures are clearly followed yet with considerable intervention from the army and 
religious authorities in the political process “when necessary”. Contrary to expectations, one 
difference that stands out is that the more religious Muslims are significantly more likely to support 
gender equality, while the more religious non-Muslims are significantly less likely to support it.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section two briefly reviews the relevant 
literature. We present our data and methodology in section three. A discussion of our empirical 
findings follows in section four. We conclude with a summary of our main results in section five. 
 
Literature review 
The past three decades have been marked by a scholarly debate regarding the relationship between 
Islam and democracy. Many scholars have argued that Islam and democracy should not be 
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considered mutually exclusive (Beinin & Stork, 1997; Entelis, 1997; Esposito & Voll, 1996; 
Kramer, 1993). Others stress perceived areas of incompatibility, suggesting that Islam acts as a 
hindrance to democratic forms of government and/or democratic values and ideals (Fukuyama, 
1992; Huntington, 1984; 1991; 1996). Adding another dimension to this relationship, Rowley and 
Smith (2009) point out to what they refer to as Islam’s democracy paradox: the fact that Muslim-
majority countries tend to be less democratic, while both individual Muslims and individuals in 
Muslim-majority countries have high support for democracy. This paradox has been observed by 
other scholars (Inglehart & Norris, 2003; Jamal & Tessler, 2008; Rose, 2002).  
A considerable body of empirical studies finds that even when other variables are controlled for, 
a statistically significant negative relationship between Islam and democracy still holds (Barro, 
1999; Fish, 2002; Potrafke, 2012; 2013; Hanusch, 2013). It is noticeably that the majority of these 
studies use country-level aggregate data. Some studies, however, have attempted to empirically 
examine the relationship between Islam and democracy at the level of the individual (see, for 
example, (Abdel Fattah, 2004; Ciftci, 2010; 2012; Shaﬁq, 2010).  
Using data from the World Values Survey from 1995 to 1997, Hofmann (2004, p. 653) examine 
whether intermediate micro-level links between factors proposed by scholars to influence, or be 
associated with, support for democracy function the same way in the Muslim and Christian 
populations of eight countries, namely, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Bosnia, Croatia, Georgia, 
Macedonia, Russia, and Turkey. The author finds that the sources and patterns of democratic 
support are not found to systematically differ between Muslim and Christian respondents in the 
countries investigated. In fact, levels of support for democracy as an ideal are generally higher 
among Muslim respondents than Eastern Orthodox respondents. However, the model reveals that 
religion plays a fairly minimal role in shaping individuals’ attitudes concerning democracy. 
While there is a considerable body of literature investigating the determinants of Muslims’ support 
for democracy, there is hardly any empirical study on how Muslims understand democracy. Norris 
(2013) is closely related to our study. Using three waves of WVS data in the period 1995-2007, 
collected from 83 countries, including twenty Muslim‐ plurality societies, Norris (2013) 
investigates public preference for four regime types, namely religious autocracy, religious 
democracy, secular autocracy, and secular democracy. Using country macro-level analysis, the 
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results show that the publics of Muslim-plurality societies displayed diverse preferences; for 
instance, while countries like Morocco and Tanzania favored secular democracy, others such as 
Albania and Indonesia proved slightly less supportive of democracy although equally secular, and 
still others, such as Algeria, displayed significant preference towards religious autocracy. 
Moreover, using individual micro-level analysis, Norris finds that Muslims display significantly 
less approval than non‐ Muslims for democratic values and rejection of autocratic rule, secularism, 
and thus have lesser preference for secular democracy. Similar patterns can be observed for the 
strength of religiosity, with the more faithful less approving secular democracy as well. By 
contrast, living in a Muslim-plurality society proves negative but not statistically significant. 
Norris concludes by stating that regime preferences are shaped both by the type of religion as well 
as by the strength of religiosity and these effects operate mainly at micro‐ level. 
De Regt (2013) and Doherty and Mecellem (2016) are also closely related to our study, yet they 
focus on Arabs preference for democracy, and not Muslims per se. As for the former, the author 
uses a series of descriptive statistics and bi-variate regressions for country-level data to examine 
how Arabs understand democracy. Utilizing the fourth wave of WVS, which includes only four 
Arab countries, namely Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Morocco, the study finds that Arabs tend to have some 
sort of a populist notion of democracy, in which a prosperous economy and severe punishment for 
criminals are perceived as the most important elements of democracy. While Arabs perceive free 
elections as another important component of democracy, they attach less value to such procedural 
aspects of democracy as civil rights, liberties, and gender equality. Moreover, Arabs believe that 
political influence on the part of the army and religious leaders is compatible with democracy. 
Using a more rigorous methodology to examine how individuals in the Arab world conceive of 
both procedural and substantive concepts of democracy, Doherty and Mecellem (2016) applies 
multivariate regression analysis to data of first wave of the Arab Barometer Survey (2006-2008), 
which was collected from four populations, namely Algeria, Jordan, Lebanon, and Palestine. The 
authors find that that many individuals in the Arab world conceive of democracy “in terms that are 
poorly aligned with dominant scholarly definitions of democracy” (Doherty & Mecellem, 2016, p. 
23). In other words, many people in the region see democracy primarily as a means to substantive 
economic ends rather than as a set of rules and procedural arrangements, which according to the 
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authors, may negatively affect the prospects of democratic development that started with Arab 
Spring in 2011.   
Unlike literature investigating Muslims’ preference for democracy, our study compares between 
the determinants of Muslims and non-Muslims’ preference for democracy and its key aspects. 
There are two reasons for our research design; first, it is clear that no clear consensus has been 
reached in studies investigating the link between Islam and democracy. Therefore, we can't explain 
with a considerable certainty the lack of democracy in Muslim-majority countries. Consequently, 
a new and different approach is needed to investigate such relationship. Second, and most 
importantly, in most of the empirical studies on Islam and democracy, it is implicitly assumed that 
Islam has one certain fixed nature surpassing nationality, ethnicity, geography, as well as economic 
and political factors, which is simply not true. Islam has a multitude of schools of jurisprudence 
and has been formulated in many different ways across time and space. Moreover, Islamic Shari'a 
is believed to be highly flexible and dependent on the circumstances through which it is applied. 
Thus, it becomes imperative to investigate the determinants that may turn Muslims to be favorable, 
as well as inimical to democracy. 
 
Methodology and Data 
To assess how Muslims view different components of democracy, we use data from the World 
Values Survey’s sixth wave (hereafter, WVS6). The WVS is a large scale opinion poll survey 
carried out by the World Values Survey Association in order to examine people’s values and 
beliefs regarding a variety of social, cultural and political issues. WVS6 was carried out between 
2010 and 2014, spanning 57 countries and over 90,000 individuals. The samples in each country 
are nationally representative. Country surveys use a common questionnaire with variables on 
beliefs, values, economic development, democratization, religion, gender equality, social capital, 
and subjective well-being. WVS6 covers the largest number of Muslim-majority countries, with 
respect to other WVS waves. Data is collected from 21 Muslim majority countries with total 
respondents of 27,788, 21,762 are Muslims (Shia or Sunni), 89% of whom reside in Muslim-
majority countries.  
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To assess individuals’ preference for democracy, we consider the question asking how desirable 
different government systems are, including democracy. Respondents are asked to rank their 
preference on a scale of four degrees, ranging from (1) very good, (2) fairly good, (3) fairly bad, 
and (4) very bad: 
 “I'm going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a 
way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly 
bad or very bad way of governing this country?” 
V127. Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections 
V128. Having experts, not government, make decisions according to what they think is 
best for the country 
V129. Having the army rule          
V130. Having a democratic political system   
                                                         
Figure 1 plots the average response value of these questions for Muslims and non-Muslims in the 
survey. The difference in the average scores for questions V128, V129 and V130 is statistically 
significant at the 0.05 level. V129 and V130 responses are particularly interesting and point to 
inconsistencies in Muslims’ views regarding government system. Muslims rate army rule as fairly 
good, while non-Muslims rate it as fairly bad on average. Conversely, for the last question that 
asks about the desirability of democracy as a system of government, Muslims’ average score is 
slightly lower indicating that they are more likely to rank it as “very good” than non-Muslims. The 
mean scores for question V127, which asks about the importance of having a strong leader, are not 
statistically significantly different however, indicating that Muslims and non-Muslims assign this 
the same degree of importance on average.  
WVS6 includes one more question that directly ask respondents to rate the desirability of living in 
a democratic country, on a scale from 1 to 10 with 1 meaning it is “not at all important” and 10 
meaning “absolutely important”:  V140. How important is it for you to live in a country that is 
governed democratically?”. It also asks respondents whether they believe they currently live in a 
democracy: “V141. And how democratically is this country being governed today? Again using a 
scale from 1 to 10, where 1 means that it is “not at all democratic” and 10 means that it is 
“completely democratic,” what position would you choose?”. Figure 2 shows that Muslims are 
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very similar to non-Muslims in their view of the importance of living in a country governed 
democratically. Muslims are however less likely to answer that they currently live in a country that 
is governed democratically. While the mean score for the first question is not statistically 
significantly different when comparing Muslims to non-Muslims, the second one is. These results 
imply that Muslims highly value democracy- as much as non-Muslims, and believe that they don’t 
have much of it currently. Conversely, they are more supportive of army rule on average than non-
Muslims as explained above. 
With such high desire for democracy among Muslims, it becomes imperative to better analyze 
what exactly Muslims envision when they consider the terms “democracy” or “democratic system 
of government”. Fortunately, WVS6 contains a question that asks more fully about several 
important components of democracy as understood by the respondents:  
Many things are desirable, but not all of them are essential characteristics of democracy. Please 
tell me for each of the following things how essential you think it is as a characteristic of 
democracy. (1 means “not at all an essential characteristic of democracy”; 10 means it definitely 
is “an essential characteristic of democracy”) 
V131. Governments tax the rich and subsidize the poor. 
V132. Religious authorities ultimately interpret the laws. 
V133. People choose their leaders in free elections. 
V134. People receive state aid for unemployment. 
V135. The army takes over when government is incompetent. 
V136. Civil rights protect people from state oppression. 
V137. The state makes people’s incomes equal. 
V138. People obey their rulers. 
V139. Women have the same rights as men. 
Following Norris (2011) and de Regt (2013), we split these questions into three broad categories 
that reflect varying understanding or strands of democracy. The first strand focuses on procedural 
aspects of democracy, such as free elections, civil rights and gender equality. Figure 3a graphs the 
mean scores of these variables for Muslims and non-Muslims. It appears that there are wide 
differences (statistically significant at the 0.05 confidence level) between the two groups in all of 
these variables. The gender equality aspect in particular stands out with the average for Muslims 
being lower than non-Muslims by 0.8 points. Civil rights and elections also fare significantly lower 
for Muslims as aspects of democracy. 
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Substantive aspects of democracy are associated with the outcome of a democratic system, in the 
form of more economic equality and state intervention to ensure this equality through taxation and 
to provide support for the needy. For simplicity, it is termed in this study as “substantive 
democracy”, given its emphasis on the perceived results of democracy. The surveys contain 
questions that ask about the state’s role in ensuring income equality through taxation and providing 
aid to help the unemployed. Figure 3b plots these results of these survey questions and interestingly 
we now see much higher mean scores for Muslims than non-Muslims (again significantly higher 
at the 0.05 level) for all three variables.  
A third aspect of democracy emphasizes the role of religious authorities, the army and obedience 
to the ruler. These notions are sometimes termed “authoritarian democracy”, in that they stem 
from a willingness to accept the authority of a single entity (e.g. the ruler) or group (religious 
scholars/the army) that supersedes that of elected officials and lawmakers. Results in Figure 3c 
imply that Muslims have a higher mean score for all of these variables, especially regarding 
religious authority. The difference between Muslims and non-Muslims is statistically significant, 
and is the highest among all the questions that ask about the three aspects of democracy. For 
example, it is twice as much as the difference in the mean score for the gender equality question. 
To gain further insight into the differences between Muslims and non-Muslims in their perceptions 
of democracy, we repeated the analysis in Figures 3a-3c for individuals who responded with an 8 
or above on question V140: How important is it for you to live in a country that is governed 
democratically? On this scale where 1 means it is “not at all important” and 10 means “absolutely 
important” what position would you choose?” These individuals could be considered “highly 
democratic” and it is instructive to see if the differences between Muslims and non-Muslims for 
such individuals persist.  
The results are in Figures 4a-4c. All of these differences are statistically significant at the 0.05 
level and suggest that our conclusions from the previous section are confirmed even for those 
highly democratic individuals. We see that Muslims have significantly lower preference for 
procedural notions of democracy, and significantly higher preference for substantive and 
authoritarian notions of democracy than non-Muslims. In most cases the differences are actually 
larger than for the full sample.  
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These statistics suggest that while Muslims highly value democracy, and believe they don’t have 
enough of it, their notion of democracy is distinct from that of non-Muslims. Muslims tend to 
associate democracy with its perceived outcomes, and do not have a substantial reservation against 
the interference of specific entities such the army or religious authorities in the governing process. 
On the other hand, they view procedural aspects of democracy, such as elections, civil rights and 
gender equality, which are considered of immense importance in Western discourse, as less 
essential than their non-Muslim counterparts. These conclusions hold even for “highly 
democratic” Muslims. 
The analysis so far has focused solely on the average scores of respondents distinguishing between 
Muslims and non-Muslims. Clearly, a person’s notion of democracy, as well as of its various 
components, will however be affected by both her own personal characteristics and the 
characteristics of the economy and society in which she resides. The analysis in the previous 
section does not take into accounts various aspects such as gender, education level, age, occupation 
of the respondent into consideration and we can expect that each of these personal characteristics 
would have an important impact on the perceptions and understanding of democracy that the 
individual has. Additionally, many economy wide variables such as the average income level or 
average education level in the economy can also have a significant impact on people’s perceptions.  
People are more likely to understand what they know and have experienced firsthand. Given the 
significant prevalence of involvements of the army, as well as of religious authority, in 
governments in most Muslim majority countries, it is not surprising that Muslims have fewer 
qualms about the role of those groups in political decision making. At the same time, there have 
been only few successful democratic experiments in these Muslim majority countries in the recent 
past which does not give individuals much faith in the procedural aspects of democracy as an 
essential component that they need to care about. To the majority of those individuals, democracy 
is largely desirable because of what they perceive as its positive expected outcome on their 
wellbeing. Consequently, Muslims value substantive aspects of democracy, significantly higher 
than procedural democracy. 
Empirical Model: Micro and Macro Determinants of Preference for Democracy and its 
Components  
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To be able to unravel the differences in values and beliefs regarding democracy and its components 
we must control for the differences in individual (micro-level) characteristics as well as the 
differences in the social, economic and political environment (macro-level) of their relevant 
societies. To capture the micro-macro interaction we turn to regression analysis to better 
understand how Muslims differ from non-Muslims in their understanding of democracy, after 
controlling for individual characteristics such as education, occupation, gender, age, and so on, as 
well as socio-economic and political characteristics such as GDP per capita, unemployment rate, 
literacy rate, female labor force participation rate, importance of oil exports, colonial history, 
quality of governance, level of democracy, and so on. 
Since the responses to the questions of interest in our data have a natural ordering, with a higher 
score implying that the respondent believes a particular component of democracy is “more 
essential” as a characteristic of democracy, we use an ordered logit regression model. In this model 
j represents the response category (j = 1,.., 10 for the democracy components/preference variables). 
It is assumed that individual preferences are based on a latent variable that is defined as a linear 
function of the explanatory variables. 
                                 𝑦𝑖
∗ = 𝛽1𝑋1𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑋2𝑚 + 𝜖𝑖,  
𝑦𝑖 = 𝑗     if    𝜇𝑗−1 < 𝑦𝑖
∗ <  𝜇𝑗; 
where    𝑗 = 0,1,2 … ,10  and  𝜇−1 = −∞;  𝜇𝑗 = ∞   
where,  𝑋1𝑖 is vector containing our individual level controls, 𝑋2𝑚 is the vector containing country-
level controls; 𝛽1 and 𝛽2  are parameter vectors to be estimated; 𝜖𝑖 is an iid stochastic error term 
that is logistic distributed and 𝜇𝑗  are the threshold parameters to be estimated with the 𝛽 parameter 
vectors. The probability of choosing response category j is defined as  
 
Pr(𝑦𝑖 = 𝑗) =  Λ(𝜇𝑗 − 𝛽1𝑋1𝑖 − 𝛽2𝑋2𝑚) − Λ(𝜇𝑗−1 − 𝛽1𝑋1𝑖 − 𝛽2𝑋2𝑚)  
 
Where Λ is the cdf of the logistic distribution.  The regression parameters 𝛽  and 
threshold parameters 𝜇 are then obtained by maximizing the log-likelihood. 
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Individual-level control variables included in 𝑋1𝑖  include age, age squared (to account for the 
possibility that the preference for democracy/its components follows a curvilinear relationship), 
dummies that represent individual levels of education (secondary and above=1), marital status 
(married or in a relationship=1), employed, gender (male), as well as number of children and a 
variable that represents the average for several measures of religiosity3. I also include a variable 
that controls for how interested in politics the respondent is, according to their own assessment. 
To control for income-related differences, we include an ordinal variable which is a subjective, 
self-reported assessment of the respondent’s poverty status. 
Country level controls that might influence an individual’s preferences for democracy include 
measures of the overall standard of living in the economy whether measured by monetary or 
nonmonetary measures, as well as how open the economy is, and how dependent on oil it might 
be. We control for the country’s GDP per capita as a measure of average wellbeing. Average 
number of years of schooling and life expectancy at birth are used as measures of non-monetary 
wellbeing. We control for the export to GDP ratio as a measure of how open the economy is, the 
share of oil in total exports as an indicator of its dependence on a single natural resource, and the 
economy wide unemployment rate. We also control for a number of other institutional variables 
that might affect views of democracy, most notably the country’s colonial history which might 
influence its formal and informal institutions, controlled for with a set of appropriate dummies. 
We also include an indicator for quality of democracy since this would have a direct impact on a 
person’s perception of what democracy entails, and the corruption perception index since this is 
likely to affect the person’s desire for change. Finally, we include a series of regional dummies 
and religious majority dummies to account for other socio-cultural aspects unique to each religious 
and each cultural heritage. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics, while Table A1 in the appendix 
lists the data sources for the macro level variables. 
 
                                                          
3 The religiosity variable is the average response on three survey questions: V145. Apart from weddings and funerals, 
about how often do you attend religious services these days? V146. Apart from weddings and funerals, about how 
often do you pray? and V152. How important is God in your life? Please use this scale to indicate. 10 means “very 
important” and 1 means “not at all important.” We chose to take the average of these three questions to get a more 
nuanced sense of how religious the person is in practice- in terms of actions such as attending religious services or 
praying-rather than their self-proclaimed religiosity level as in question V147, that asks: Independently of whether 
you attend religious services or not, would you say you are: 1 A religious person 2 Not a religious person 3 An atheist. 
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Results 
Results of the ordered logit regressions are in Tables 2 through 5. We use the aforementioned 
questions in WVS6 that gauge first the preference for democracy as a governing system, and 
second the preference for the various aspects of democracy: procedural, substantive and 
authoritarian to see how these preferences differ by individual and country characteristics. Table 
2 presents results for the preference for democracy variable (see notes at the bottom of figure 2 for 
details) separately for Muslims and non-Muslims.  
For Muslims, having a secondary degree or higher, having children, being interested in politics 
and being religious all have a positive and significant effect on the preference for a democratic 
system of government. However, being unemployed has a significantly negative impact on this 
preference. Several country wide variables also were found to have a significant impact on the 
preference for democracy: GDP per capita, unemployment rate, control of corruption, having been 
a French colony, living in a predominantly Muslim nation, and living in Scandinavia all have a 
positive and significant impact. On the other hand, the higher the share of oil in exports, the higher 
the life expectancy at birth, having been a British colony, residing in a predominant Protestant or 
Orthodox nation, in Africa, Asia, Europe and the Middle East all have a significant negative 
impact. 
Comparing Muslims to non-Muslims, and focusing only on the differences, for non-Muslims age, 
being male and being married have a positive and significant impact (these were insignificant for 
Muslims). Being income poor (as self-proclaimed in the survey) has a negative and significant 
impact (was insignificant for Muslims). For country variables, a few variables reverse signs 
compared to Muslims’ regression: GDP per capita and control of corruption, having been a French 
colony have negative and significant impacts while life expectancy and level of democracy have 
positive and significant impact. These sign reversals are in some cases puzzling, especially GDP 
per capita and control of corruption. This result however may refer to the negative relationship 
between democracy and economic development, which has been tackled in a considerable body of 
literature in economics and political science4. Age and life expectancy, having positive effects, 
suggests that there might be a threshold effect with these variables having insignificant or negative 
                                                          
4
 For more, see Barro (1997) and Gerring et al. (2005) 
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impact up to a point but then after that is surpassed they start to have a positive impact. Similarly, 
the insignificant coefficient on “level of democracy” for Muslims, might reflect the fact that the 
kind of democracy that they have seen has not given them much to desire in terms of what 
democracy might entail. 
Turning now to decomposing democracy into its components for which we have data, we present 
results for the procedural aspects of democracy: importance of elections, civil rights and gender 
equality in Table 3. Education, children, interest in politics, religiosity at the individual level, and 
GDP per capita, unemployment rate, control of corruption, French colonial heritage, living in Asia 
(regardless of the predominant religion) all have a positive and significant effect on Muslims’ 
preferences for procedural aspects of democracy. Being unemployed, income poor, higher average 
years of schooling for the country, higher life expectancy, having been a British colony, living in 
Africa or the Middle East all have a negative impact. When gender equality is the dependent 
variable, we also notice that being male has a negative and significant coefficient for both Muslims 
and non-Muslims. Comparison with non-Muslims shows very similar conclusions to the ones 
described above for the importance of democracy questions. Similarly, having higher oil share of 
exports has a significant negative coefficient for non-Muslims for the gender equality question, 
lending support to the hypothesis of Ross (2013) that there might indeed be an “oil curse” 
especially for females outcomes. Interestingly this coefficient is insignificant for Muslims for this 
aspect of democracy5. 
Table 4 presents the substantive aspects of democracy regressions. Some of the results that stand 
out: Individuals who are more educated are less likely to support redistributive efforts, both 
Muslims and non-Muslims, which is expected given the likelihood that these are the more well off 
individuals. More religious individuals might support taxing the rich, however they do not support 
having the state equalize incomes completely: this is only significant for non-Muslims however. 
In countries where oil is a higher percentage of exports there is less support for redistribution, but 
it is more significant among non-Muslims. 
                                                          
5
 For the elections question in the first two columns of the table, both Muslims and non-Muslims have a positive and 
significant coefficient of the share of oil exports variable. 
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Table 5 presents results for the authoritarian aspects of democracy. In general, Muslims and non-
Muslims are more likely to reject army rule, religious authorities interpreting the law and obeying 
the ruler, if they are males, the higher their education levels, age, the economy wide education 
level and life expectancy, and the higher the level of democracy they currently enjoy. Both 
Muslims and non-Muslims have higher preference for authoritarian democracy when they have 
more children, maybe as a sense of safety and security, when they are more religious, the higher 
the GDP per capita, the unemployment rate, the lower the control of corruption and when they live 
in a predominantly Catholic, Muslim or Orthodox nation. The higher the share of oil in exports 
and the mean years of schooling the lower the preference for authoritarian democracy for both 
Muslims and non-Muslims. Notice that there are few differences between Muslims and non-
Muslims when we control for the independent variables. For example, the religiosity and the 
average per capita GDP of the economy variables have positive and significant coefficients for 
both, for these three dependent variables  
 
Summary and Conclusion 
The cross-national multi-level analysis presented here demonstrates that Muslims have a 
significantly different preference of democracy and its components than non-Muslims. Our 
descriptive statistics show that Muslims tend to associate democracy with its perceived outcomes, 
and do not have a substantial reservation against the interference of specific entities such the army 
or religious authorities in the governing process. Conversely, they view procedural aspects of 
democracy, such as elections, civil rights and gender equality, which are considered of immense 
importance in Western discourse, as less essential than their non-Muslim counterparts.  
The determinants of Muslims’ attitudes towards democracy and its components, are in many cases 
very similar to those of non-Muslims, as our regression analysis has shown. We summarize some 
of the most important similarities and differences below, with respect to each variable in the model. 
 
Individual variables: 
Age: While older non-Muslim respondents valued democracy and its components highly, age was 
insignificant in all of the Muslim regressions.   
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Gender: Muslim males had similar views to Muslim females except on gender equality, army rule 
and religious authority.  In the case of gender equality, being male is associated with a lower 
preference for gender equality. Interestingly, this negative preference for gender equality is 
significant for all males in the sample, whether Muslim or non-Muslim. Non-Muslim males are 
also more likely to have a lower preference for all substantive aspects of democracy-there was no 
significant difference between Muslim males and females on these aspects. With regard to army 
rule and religious authority, Muslim males have a significantly lower preference for these than 
their female counterparts. Non-Muslim males were also more likely to support the notion of 
obeying rulers; this was not significant for Muslim males. 
Education: Higher education is associated with a positive preference for democracy and its 
procedural components, but negatively associated with its substantive and authoritarian aspects, 
as expected. Muslims and non-Muslims are largely similar in this respect. 
Marital status and children: For Muslims, being married does not significantly affect their 
democracy preferences. Married non-Muslims have significantly higher preference for democracy 
compared to singles, but significantly lower preference for substantive and authoritarian aspects 
of democracy. Having children is associated with higher preference for democracy and all its 
components for Muslims, including authoritarian; except for gender equality and equal incomes. 
Interestingly, non-Muslims with children are less likely to support the procedural and substantive 
aspects, and more likely to support the authoritarian aspects of democracy. 
Unemployment and poverty: being unemployed is largely associated with a negative view of 
democracy and its components, with the exception of unemployment aid under the substantive 
components which is not surprising. This is true for both Muslims and non-Muslims. The self-
declared poverty status is also largely associated with a negative view of democracy and its 
procedural components for both Muslims and non-Muslims. For substantive aspects, the 
association is positive when it is significant. Conversely, poor Muslims have negative preference 
for authoritarian aspects, while for non-Muslims this is positive. 
Interest in politics: Interest in politics is associated with a positive preference for democracy, but 
there are some differences between Muslims and non-Muslims in the preference for democracy’s 
components. Most notably, Muslims who are interested in politics are more likely to support army 
rule, non-Muslims who are interested in politics however have a clear negative preference for all 
authoritarian aspects of democracy.  
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Religiosity: While religiosity is positively correlated with higher preference for democracy and 
procedural democracy, it is also positively correlated with authoritarian democracy and this is true 
for both Muslims and non-Muslims. This result suggests that religious individuals may seek a 
unique kind of democracy, where democratic procedures are clearly followed yet with a 
considerable intervention from the army and religious authorities in the political process “when 
necessary”. Contrary to expectations, one difference that stands out is that the more religious 
Muslims are significantly more likely to support gender equality, while the more religious non-
Muslims are significantly less likely to support it. Another notable finding is that religiosity among 
Muslims is not significantly associated with the preference for the substantive aspects of 
democracy, that encourage income equality, state provision of unemployment aid and taxing the 
rich, while for non-Muslims there is a significant negative preference for these aspects. The finding 
that more religious Muslims may not value substantive aspects of democracy can be understood 
in the context of the fact that Islamic Shari’a does not have a clear and decisive economic mandate6.  
 
Macroeconomics variables: 
Economic wellbeing: Income per capita is associated with higher preference for democracy for 
Muslims, but lower preference for non-Muslims. It is however associated with greater support for 
democracy’s components including authoritarian aspects, for both Muslims and non-Muslims. 
Other aspects of wellbeing such as economy wide health (life expectancy) and education levels 
are associated with a lower preference for democracy for Muslims but a higher one for non-
Muslims. When examining the impact of these measures on procedural, substantive and 
authoritarian aspects of democracy however, they are largely associated with lower preference for 
all components, and there is no difference between Muslims and non-Muslims.  
Unemployment: The higher the unemployment rate in an economy, the higher the preference for 
democracy and all its components for Muslims. For non-Muslims, higher unemployment is 
associated with lower preference for elections and gender equality and no significant effect on the 
preference for other aspects of democracy. 
                                                          
6
 For the indecisiveness of Islamic law on this issue, see Gouda (2013) 
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Share of oil exports: The share of oil exports seems to have a negative impact on several aspects 
of democracy, including authoritarian, however there is no apparent difference between Muslims 
and non-Muslims in this respect. Nevertheless, the coefficients are considerably small.  
 Corruption: The higher the perception of the degree of control of corruption in a country, the 
higher the preference for procedural and substantive aspects of democracy, and the lower the 
preference for authoritarian aspects. Again there is no apparent difference between Muslims and 
non-Muslims, with the exception of the question on importance of living in a democratically 
governed country, where the coefficient is negative and significant for non-Muslims and the 
opposite for Muslims. It seems that in countries where corruption is perceived to be low people 
have stronger preference for the procedural and substantive aspects of democracy since they feel 
their participation will count and the redistribution will in fact be fair, and simultaneously, that 
there is less need for the army or religious authority to interfere. 
Level of democracy: As expected, there is a positive association between level of democracy and 
preference for democracy and its procedural and substantive components, and negative association 
with preference for its authoritarian components. There is no apparent difference between Muslims 
and non-Muslims once again. 
Colonial heritage, religious majority and region: British colonial heritage has a consistently 
negative effect on the preference for democracy, as well as on its procedural, substantive and 
authoritarian aspects (except army rule), for both Muslims and non-Muslims. Conversely, French 
colonial heritage has a favorable influence on the preference for democratic notions for Muslims 
and a negative one for non-Muslims. Living in a predominantly Protestant or Catholic country 
seems to significantly widen the difference between Muslims and non-Muslims’ attitudes towards 
democracy and its components, with Muslims consistently having a positive preference for all 
aspects of democracy, except equal incomes and obeying rulers, while that of non-Muslims is often 
negative or insignificant. On the other hand, living in a predominantly Muslim or Orthodox nation 
has a positive influence on democracy and its components for both Muslims and non-Muslims. 
Especially noteworthy is the positive and significant preference for gender equality for Muslims 
in Muslim majority nations. Living in Africa and the Middle East is largely associated with a 
negative preference for democracy and its components, including authoritarian aspects such as 
army rule and religious authority. Muslims in Asia have a positive preference for procedural 
democracy, except gender equality, while Asian non-Muslims have a negative preference for all 
Topics in Middle Eastern and African Economies  
Proceedings of Middle East Economic Association 
Vol. 19, Issue No. 2, September 2017 
 
114 
 
three: elections, civil rights and gender equality. Asian Muslims and non-Muslims are more similar 
in their support for both substantive and authoritarian aspects of democracy. 
In this paper we have attempted to understand how Muslims view democracy and how this view 
has been shaped by their unique individual, cultural, social and economic experiences. Some have 
argued that Muslims have a unique view of democracy that stems from the incompatibility of Islam 
as a religion and key democratic concepts. Anderson (2004) writes, “[w]ith regard to Islam it was 
argued that reliance on a fixed religious text and quasi-legal ordinances, the emphasis on divine 
sovereignty, and the supposed lack of distinction between the religious and the political realm, all 
worked against democratic development” (2004, p. 197). Yet, our results here have shown that 
while Muslims’ view of democracy largely favors the substantive aspects that emphasize the 
perceived outcomes that such democracy is deemed to bring about, the historical experiences and 
current economic, social and political environments that Muslims live in have a significant impact 
on their views. In particular, contrary to conventional views, we found that neither religiosity nor 
living in a Muslim-majority country were associated with negative views of democracy, but with 
the opposite. In fact religious Muslims were more likely to support gender equality while religious 
non-Muslims were less likely to support it. Moreover, religious individuals across the board 
showed support for authoritarian notions: army rule, religious authority interpreting laws, and 
obeying rulers, not just Muslims. Similar conclusions were drawn for everyone living in Muslim-
majority countries, regardless of their religion. 
Muslim-majority countries' historical experiences have been negatively impacted by the West, and 
as such it is not surprising that Muslims have developed negative feelings towards Western values, 
just like many in Africa and Asia who have had similar negative experiences. Western imperialism, 
exploitation, political interference, and the West’s direct or indirect (actual or perceived) 
involvement in regional wars led to an entrenched feeling of distrust, fear, and insecurity among 
many towards the West, including Muslims. Because democracy is generally thought of as a 
product of the West, many have been reluctant to accept Western democracy (Huntington, 1996, 
p. 211). Esposito and Voll (1996) argue that Muslims do not want a Western imposed democracy 
and prefer to build their own version of a democratic system which would speak to their issues and 
concerns rather than to Western interests.  
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The results in this paper suggest that policy makers and international organizations working to 
promote democracy in Muslim majority countries need to emphasize the substantive aspects of 
democracy. Our results strongly imply that Muslims favor democracy when they feel it can 
improve their living conditions. The challenge is not to merely point to its potential, but to find 
and promote practical mechanisms through which these outcomes can be delivered. Muslims, and 
many others around the world, have been living in so-called “democracies” that have included 
elements such as elections or a parliament, but these have merely been facades for brutal 
authoritarian regimes that have neither achieved prosperity not truly provided democratic 
representation. It is therefore not surprising that Muslims’ views of democracy have been shaped 
by these less than ideal experiences. 
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Figure 1: Political System Preference for Muslims and Non-Muslims 
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Source: Authors’ calculations from WVS6 based on the question: “I'm going to describe various types of political 
systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a 
very good (1), fairly good (2), fairly bad (3) or very bad (4) way of governing this country?” 
 
V127. Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections 
V128. Having experts, not government, make decisions according to what they think is best for the country 
V129. Having the army rule          
V130. Having a democratic political system                                                           
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Importance and State of Democracy 
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Source: Authors’ calculations from WVS6 based on the questions: 1. “V140. How important is it for you to live in a 
country that is governed democratically? On this scale where 1 means it is “not at all important” and 10 means 
“absolutely important” what position would you choose?”, 2. “V141. And how democratically is this country being 
governed today? using a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 means that it is “not at all democratic” and 10 means that it is 
“completely democratic,” what position would you choose?”  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3a: Mean Scores of “Procedural Democracy” Variables, for Muslims and Non-Muslims 
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Figure 3b: Mean Scores of “Substantive Democracy” Variables, for Muslims and Non-Muslims 
 
 
4
5
6
7
8
9
elections civil rights gender equality
Nonmuslim Muslim
4
5
6
7
8
tax rich unemployment aid equal incomes
Nonmuslim Muslim
Topics in Middle Eastern and African Economies  
Proceedings of Middle East Economic Association 
Vol. 19, Issue No. 2, September 2017 
 
123 
 
Figure 3C: Mean Scores of “Authoritarian Democracy” Variables, for Muslims and Non-
Muslims 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations from WVS6 based on the questions that ask respondent to rank various aspects of 
democracy as an essential characteristic of democracy=10, or not an essential characteristic=1 for the following 
characteristics:  
V131. Governments tax the rich and subsidize the poor. 
V132. Religious authorities ultimately interpret the laws. 
V133. People choose their leaders in free elections. 
V134. People receive state aid for unemployment. 
V135. The army takes over when government is incompetent. 
V136. Civil rights protect people from state oppression. 
V137. The state makes people’s incomes equal. 
V138. People obey their rulers. 
V139. Women have the same rights as men. 
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Figure 4a: Mean Scores of “Procedural Democracy” Variables, for Muslims and non-Muslims 
who highly value democracy; whose response for V140 > 8. 
 
Figure 4b: Mean Scores of “Substantive Democracy” Variables, for Muslims and non-Muslims, 
who highly value democracy; whose response for V140 > 8. 
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Figure 4C: Mean Scores of “Authoritarian Democracy” Variables, for Muslims and non-Muslims 
who highly value democracy; whose response for V140 > 8. 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations from WVS6 based on the questions that ask respondent to rank various aspects of 
democracy as an essential characteristic of democracy=10, or not an essential characteristic=1 for the following 
characteristics:  
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V131. Governments tax the rich and subsidize the poor. 
V132. Religious authorities ultimately interpret the laws. 
V133. People choose their leaders in free elections. 
V134. People receive state aid for unemployment. 
V135. The army takes over when government is incompetent. 
V136. Civil rights protect people from state oppression. 
V137. The state makes people’s incomes equal. 
V138. People obey their rulers. 
V139. Women have the same rights as men; 
Limiting the sample to respondents who highly value democracy; i.e., those who selected 8 or higher for question 
V140: How important is it for you to live in a country that is governed democratically? On this scale where 1 means 
it is “not at all important” and 10 means “absolutely important” what position would you choose?” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: Sample Statistics of Variables used in the Regressions 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Individual micro-level variables 
Muslim 
84,030 0.258979 0.438077 0 1 
Age 90,167 42.05383 16.48077 16 99 
Age squared 90,167 2040.138 1545.258 256 9801 
male 90,350 0.480255 0.499613 0 1 
Secondary & above 90,350 0.610814 0.487569 0 1 
married 90,350 0.634499 0.481573 0 1 
Number of children 62,896 2.640581 1.56599 1 8 
unemployed 90,350 0.089751 0.285826 0 1 
Interested  in politics 90,350 0.463962 0.498702 0 1 
religiosity 88,815 5.654007 2.304786 1 10 
Income poor 90,350 0.295451 0.456248 0 1 
Country macro-level variables 
GDP per capita 86,082 21843.72 21080.11 1400.44 130989.8 
Avg. Oil Exp Shr 05-14 86,612 25.64495 31.18816 0.012536 97.33094 
Mean years of schooling (UNDP  2014) 87,112 8.964528 2.676664 2.51 12.95 
Life expectancy at birth, 2014 (UNDP 2014) 87,112 72.65468 7.265543 52.51 83.58 
Unemployment (% of total labor force), 2012  87,112 8.120523 5.731661 0.5 25.2 
Control of Corruption 2012 (WGI 2014) 88,350 0.048584 1.043311 -1.4 2.32 
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Level of Democracy (Freedom House/Polity) 85,850 6.777268 2.963208 0.25 10 
British colony 90,350 0.320509 0.466675 0 1 
French colony 90,350 0.053182 0.224398 0 1 
Predominant Protestant nation dummy  88,350 0.176186 0.38098 0 1 
Predominant Catholic nation dummy  88,350 0.218359 0.413135 0 1 
Predominant Muslim nation dummy  89,350 0.311002 0.462906 0 1 
Predominant Orthodox nation dummy  88,350 0.117035 0.321463 0 1 
Africa dummy 88,350 0.125286 0.331045 0 1 
Asia dummy 88,350 0.273141 0.445575 0 1 
Central and Eastern Europe dummy 88,350 0.184584 0.387962 0 1 
Middle East dummy 88,350 0.17914 0.383472 0 1 
North America dummy 88,350 0.0479 0.213557 0 1 
South America dummy 88,350 0.106836 0.308907 0 1 
Scandinavia dummy 88,350 0.01365 0.116035 0 1 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Regressions for importance of democracy question (V140), Muslims and non-Muslims 
 Muslim Non-Muslim 
   
Age 0.007 0.017*** 
 (0.008) (0.004) 
Age squared 0 -0.000* 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Male 0.045 0.055** 
 (0.036) (0.019) 
Secondary & above 0.192*** 0.200*** 
 (0.040) (0.021) 
Married 0.112 0.105*** 
 (0.062) (0.024) 
Number of children 0.037*** 0.001 
 (0.011) (0.008) 
Unemployed -0.191* -0.027 
 (0.078) (0.035) 
Interested  in politics 0.180*** 0.256*** 
 (0.035) (0.019) 
Religiosity 0.097*** 0.056*** 
Topics in Middle Eastern and African Economies  
Proceedings of Middle East Economic Association 
Vol. 19, Issue No. 2, September 2017 
 
128 
 
 (0.013) (0.005) 
Income poor -0.026 -0.123*** 
 (0.038) (0.022) 
Ln GDP per capita 0.357*** -0.190*** 
 (0.067) (0.034) 
Avg. Oil Export Share  -0.003* 0 
 (0.002) (0.001) 
Mean years of schooling  -0.005 0.078*** 
 (0.017) (0.011) 
Life expectancy at birth -0.036*** 0.045*** 
 (0.009) (0.005) 
Unemployment  0.059*** -0.003 
 (0.009) (0.002) 
Control of Corruption  0.268*** -0.113*** 
 (0.067) (0.024) 
British colony -0.406*** -0.277*** 
 (0.062) (0.047) 
French colony 0.182* -1.198*** 
 (0.084) (0.269) 
Level of Democracy  0.001 0.063*** 
 (0.015) (0.005) 
Predominant Protestant 
nation  -1.008*** -0.009 
 (0.243) (0.052) 
Predominant Catholic 
nation  0.217 -0.097* 
 (0.191) (0.048) 
Predominant Muslim 
nation  0.439*** 0.615*** 
 (0.088) (0.066) 
Predominant Orthodox 
nation  -0.614*** 0.083 
 (0.174) (0.059) 
Africa  -1.414*** 0.006 
 (0.204) (0.078) 
Asia  -0.940*** -0.328*** 
 (0.191) (0.048) 
Central and Eastern 
Europe  -0.974*** -0.551*** 
 (0.197) (0.050) 
Middle East  -1.314*** -0.195 
 (0.200) (0.254) 
North America  -1.589 -0.186*** 
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 (1.207) (0.056) 
South America  -0.378 -0.057 
 (0.391) (0.049) 
Scandinavia dummy 2.124* 1.124*** 
 (1.071) (0.100) 
N 11475 40581 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Procedural Aspects of Democracy 
 Elections Civil Rights Gender Equality 
 Muslim 
Non-
Muslim Muslim 
Non-
Muslim Muslim 
Non-
Muslim 
Age 0.011 0.022*** 0.008 0.026*** 0.014 0.011** 
 (0.008) (0.004) (0.008) (0.004) (0.008) (0.004) 
Age squared 0 -0.000*** 0 -0.000*** 0 0 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Male 0.021 0.035 -0.019 0.023 -0.500*** -0.145*** 
 (0.036) (0.019) (0.035) (0.019) (0.035) (0.019) 
Secondary & above 0.084* 0.110*** 0.093* 0.108*** 0.038 0.068** 
 (0.039) (0.021) (0.039) (0.021) (0.039) (0.021) 
Married -0.073 -0.008 0.085 -0.025 0.006 0.026 
 (0.063) (0.024) (0.063) (0.024) (0.062) (0.024) 
Number of children 0.040*** -0.022** 0.045*** -0.015 0.005 -0.017* 
 (0.011) (0.008) (0.011) (0.008) (0.011) (0.008) 
Unemployed -0.201* -0.075* -0.145 -0.069* -0.026 -0.019 
 (0.079) (0.035) (0.079) (0.035) (0.079) (0.035) 
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Interested  in 
politics -0.017 0.105*** 0.023 0.109*** 0.045 0.070*** 
 (0.035) (0.019) (0.035) (0.019) (0.035) (0.019) 
Religiosity 0.078*** 0.019*** 0.044*** -0.007 0.043*** -0.012* 
 (0.013) (0.005) (0.013) (0.005) (0.013) (0.005) 
Income poor -0.005 -0.138*** -0.077* -0.135*** 0.054 -0.124*** 
 (0.038) (0.022) (0.038) (0.022) (0.038) (0.022) 
Ln GDP per capita 0.420*** -0.059 0.464*** 0.293*** 0.234*** 0.117*** 
 (0.068) (0.034) (0.066) (0.033) (0.067) (0.034) 
Avg. Oil Export 
Share  0.003* 0.001* 0 -0.007*** -0.002 -0.002** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Mean years of 
schooling  -0.149*** -0.007 -0.092*** -0.043*** -0.096*** -0.038*** 
 (0.017) (0.010) (0.017) (0.010) (0.017) (0.011) 
Life expectancy at 
birth -0.072*** 0.008 -0.094*** -0.050*** -0.029** -0.014** 
 (0.009) (0.005) (0.009) (0.004) (0.009) (0.005) 
Unemployment  0.059*** -0.013*** 0.064*** 0.001 0.007 -0.016*** 
 (0.009) (0.002) (0.009) (0.002) (0.009) (0.002) 
Control of 
Corruption  0.577*** 0.123*** 0.470*** 0.078*** 0.299*** 0.014 
 (0.067) (0.022) (0.064) (0.022) (0.064) (0.023) 
British colony -0.465*** -0.182*** -0.725*** -0.709*** -0.507*** -0.542*** 
 (0.055) (0.046) (0.055) (0.045) (0.055) (0.046) 
French colony 0.352*** -0.908*** 0.606*** -1.084*** 0.135 -0.974*** 
 (0.080) (0.246) (0.080) (0.251) (0.081) (0.249) 
Level of 
Democracy  0.044** 0.086*** -0.003 0.021*** 0.060*** 0.078*** 
 (0.014) (0.005) (0.014) (0.005) (0.014) (0.005) 
Predominant 
Protestant nation   0.344 0.312*** 0.155 -0.174*** 0.36 0.117* 
 (0.235) (0.049) (0.222) (0.048) (0.249) (0.049) 
Predominant 
Catholic nation  0.436** -0.103* 0.405** -0.254*** -0.092 0.018 
 (0.154) (0.045) (0.152) (0.044) (0.153) (0.046) 
Predominant 
Muslim nation  0.687*** 0.373*** 0.548*** 0.149* 0.434*** -0.041 
 (0.087) (0.064) (0.086) (0.064) (0.086) (0.064) 
Predominant 
Orthodox nation 0.521*** 0.663*** 0.342* 0.384*** 0.182 0.198*** 
 (0.147) (0.060) (0.148) (0.058) (0.147) (0.060) 
Africa  -0.954*** -0.382*** -1.005*** -0.467*** -0.712*** -0.483*** 
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 (0.123) (0.067) (0.120) (0.066) (0.121) (0.068) 
Asia  0.304*** -0.262*** 0.572*** -0.113*** -0.288*** -0.266*** 
 (0.085) (0.035) (0.084) (0.034) (0.082) (0.035) 
Middle East  -0.455*** -0.351 -0.289** 0.311 -0.781*** 0.103 
 (0.104) (0.228) (0.102) (0.234) (0.101) (0.232) 
Scandinavia  0.485 0.867*** 0.985 0.906*** 0.334 1.360*** 
 (0.709) (0.099) (0.651) (0.080) (0.708) (0.112) 
N 11251 40064 11005 39118 11317 40335 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses. 
  
Table 4: Substantive Aspects of Democracy 
 Tax the rich Unemployment aid Equal Incomes 
 Muslim 
Non-
Muslim Muslim 
Non-
Muslim Muslim 
Non-
Muslim 
Age -0.012 0.007* -0.002 0.011** 0.003 0.003 
 (0.008) (0.004) (0.008) (0.004) (0.008) (0.004) 
Age squared 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Male -0.062 -0.051** 0.026 -0.103*** -0.006 -0.089*** 
 (0.035) (0.018) (0.035) (0.018) (0.035) (0.018) 
Secondary & above 0.017 -0.113*** 0.006 -0.124*** -0.101** -0.232*** 
 (0.039) (0.020) (0.039) (0.020) (0.039) (0.020) 
Married -0.077 -0.042 -0.007 -0.072** -0.023 -0.090*** 
 (0.062) (0.023) (0.062) (0.023) (0.061) (0.023) 
Number of children 0.042*** -0.023** 0.023* -0.012 0.002 -0.005 
 (0.011) (0.008) (0.011) (0.008) (0.011) (0.008) 
Unemployed 0 -0.001 0.041 0.097** -0.033 -0.022 
 (0.078) (0.034) (0.078) (0.034) (0.078) (0.034) 
Interested  in 
politics -0.026 -0.084*** -0.105** -0.025 -0.044 -0.181*** 
 (0.035) (0.018) (0.035) (0.018) (0.035) (0.018) 
Religiosity 0.009 -0.025*** -0.01 -0.028*** -0.004 -0.033*** 
 (0.012) (0.005) (0.013) (0.005) (0.012) (0.005) 
Income poor 0.058 0.089*** 0.093* 0.014 -0.022 0.072*** 
 (0.038) (0.021) (0.038) (0.021) (0.037) (0.021) 
Ln GDP per capita 0.498*** 0.191*** 0.309*** 0.434*** 0.243*** 0.396*** 
 (0.065) (0.033) (0.066) (0.033) (0.065) (0.033) 
Avg. Oil Export 
Share  -0.011*** -0.003*** -0.001 -0.012*** 0 -0.017*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Mean years of 
schooling  -0.141*** -0.004 -0.223*** -0.139*** -0.156*** -0.133*** 
 (0.016) (0.010) (0.016) (0.010) (0.016) (0.010) 
Life expectancy at 
birth -0.074*** -0.048*** -0.079*** -0.068*** -0.051*** -0.080*** 
 (0.009) (0.004) (0.009) (0.004) (0.009) (0.004) 
Unemployment  0.032*** 0.023*** 0.039*** 0.021*** -0.012 0.015*** 
 (0.008) (0.002) (0.009) (0.002) (0.009) (0.002) 
Control of 
Corruption  0.256*** -0.039 0.591*** 0.079*** 0.380*** -0.106*** 
 (0.063) (0.021) (0.063) (0.021) (0.064) (0.021) 
British colony -0.267*** -0.417*** -0.845*** -0.780*** -0.648*** -0.360*** 
 (0.053) (0.044) (0.054) (0.044) (0.054) (0.044) 
French colony -0.033 -0.587* 0.114 -1.200*** 0.056 -0.006 
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 (0.077) (0.249) (0.078) (0.256) (0.079) (0.258) 
Level of 
Democracy  -0.097*** -0.003 -0.077*** 0.017*** -0.028* -0.085*** 
 (0.013) (0.005) (0.013) (0.005) (0.014) (0.005) 
Predominant 
Protestant nation   0.715*** -0.103* 0.940*** -0.133** 0.128 -0.001 
 (0.215) (0.045) (0.222) (0.046) (0.226) (0.046) 
Predominant 
Catholic nation  0.471*** -0.291*** 0.381** -0.230*** -0.554*** 0.015 
 (0.142) (0.043) (0.145) (0.043) (0.146) (0.043) 
Predominant 
Muslim nation  0.946*** -0.204** 0.841*** 0.458*** 0.446*** 0.227*** 
 (0.085) (0.063) (0.084) (0.063) (0.085) (0.063) 
Predominant 
Orthodox nation 1.136*** -0.039 1.261*** 0.810*** 0.503*** 0.285*** 
 (0.142) (0.057) (0.142) (0.057) (0.142) (0.058) 
Africa  -0.723*** -0.535*** -1.026*** -0.848*** -0.873*** -0.962*** 
 (0.117) (0.064) (0.118) (0.065) (0.119) (0.065) 
Asia  0.806*** 0.457*** 0.535*** 0.015 -0.106 -0.205*** 
 (0.081) (0.033) (0.082) (0.033) (0.080) (0.033) 
Middle East  0.074 0.652** -0.161 -0.031 -0.385*** -0.671** 
 (0.100) (0.232) (0.100) (0.240) (0.099) (0.241) 
Scandinavia  0.75 0.230*** 0.069 0.134 -2.340*** -1.222*** 
 (0.593) (0.070) (0.582) (0.072) (0.572) (0.074) 
N 11214 39761 11273 39967 11171 39569 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table 5: Authoritarian Aspects of Democracy  
 Army Rule Religious Authority Obey Rulers 
 Muslim 
Non-
Muslim Muslim 
Non-
Muslim Muslim 
Non-
Muslim 
Age 0.006 -0.012** -0.008 -0.021*** 0.006 -0.009* 
 (0.008) (0.004) (0.008) (0.004) (0.008) (0.004) 
Age squared 0 0 0 0.000*** 0 0.000** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Male -0.087* 0.027 -0.073* -0.001 0.028 0.114*** 
 (0.035) (0.019) (0.035) (0.019) (0.035) (0.019) 
Secondary & above 0.048 -0.230*** -0.172*** -0.269*** -0.029 -0.208*** 
 (0.039) (0.021) (0.039) (0.021) (0.039) (0.020) 
Married -0.015 -0.039 -0.042 -0.106*** -0.048 -0.024 
 (0.062) (0.024) (0.062) (0.024) (0.062) (0.023) 
Number of children 0.033** 0.044*** 0.026* 0.061*** 0.045*** 0.056*** 
 (0.011) (0.008) (0.011) (0.008) (0.011) (0.008) 
Unemployed 0.002 0.078* -0.160* -0.011 -0.063 -0.056 
 (0.077) (0.035) (0.078) (0.035) (0.078) (0.034) 
Interested  in politics 0.077* -0.133*** 0.055 -0.141*** 0.031 -0.128*** 
 (0.035) (0.019) (0.035) (0.019) (0.035) (0.019) 
Religiosity 0.055*** 0.079*** 0.124*** 0.158*** 0.108*** 0.064*** 
 (0.012) (0.005) (0.013) (0.005) (0.012) (0.005) 
Income poor -0.003 0.176*** -0.089* 0.158*** 0.03 0.052* 
 (0.037) (0.021) (0.038) (0.021) (0.037) (0.021) 
Ln GDP per capita 0.536*** 0.525*** 0.545*** 0.357*** 0.242*** 0.094** 
 (0.066) (0.033) (0.065) (0.033) (0.066) (0.032) 
Avg. Oil Export 
Share  -0.016*** -0.010*** -0.014*** -0.009*** -0.011*** 0 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Mean years of 
schooling  -0.212*** -0.181*** -0.251*** -0.067*** 0.100*** -0.063*** 
 (0.016) (0.011) (0.016) (0.010) (0.017) (0.010) 
Life expectancy at 
birth 0.011 -0.060*** -0.008 -0.042*** -0.102*** -0.016*** 
 (0.009) (0.005) (0.009) (0.005) (0.009) (0.004) 
Unemployment  0.083*** 0.006* 0.055*** 0.028*** 0.102*** 0.023*** 
 (0.009) (0.002) (0.009) (0.002) (0.009) (0.002) 
Control of 
Corruption  -0.538*** -0.305*** -0.290*** -0.224*** 0.179** -0.080*** 
 (0.063) (0.022) (0.064) (0.022) (0.063) (0.021) 
British colony -0.062 -0.097* 0.101 0.103* 0.147** 0.072 
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 (0.055) (0.046) (0.054) (0.046) (0.055) (0.044) 
French colony -0.343*** 0.051 -0.495*** -0.625* 0.384*** -0.384 
 (0.081) (0.248) (0.080) (0.252) (0.079) (0.254) 
Level of Democracy  -0.134*** -0.131*** -0.129*** -0.098*** -0.012 -0.064*** 
 (0.014) (0.005) (0.013) (0.005) (0.014) (0.005) 
Predominant 
Protestant nation   -0.207 0.890*** 0.788*** 0.496*** -2.179*** -0.043 
 (0.247) (0.050) (0.232) (0.050) (0.240) (0.048) 
Predominant 
Catholic nation  0.618*** 0.469*** 0.927*** 0.532*** 0.014 0.428*** 
 (0.149) (0.045) (0.148) (0.045) (0.150) (0.044) 
Predominant Muslim 
nation  0.114 0.033 0.782*** 0.186** 0.263** 0.387*** 
 (0.084) (0.064) (0.085) (0.064) (0.085) (0.063) 
Predominant 
Orthodox nation 0.475*** 0.327*** 0.864*** 0.255*** -0.092 0.506*** 
 (0.142) (0.060) (0.142) (0.060) (0.144) (0.058) 
Africa  0.193 -0.504*** 0.282* 0.151* -0.474*** 0.538*** 
 (0.119) (0.066) (0.118) (0.066) (0.118) (0.065) 
Asia  0.259** 0.195*** 0.375*** 0.200*** 0.409*** 0.402*** 
 (0.082) (0.034) (0.082) (0.034) (0.081) (0.033) 
Middle East  -0.703*** 0.27 -0.495*** 0.593* -0.566*** 0.056 
 (0.100) (0.233) (0.100) (0.236) (0.100) (0.238) 
Scandinavia  1.310* -0.764*** -0.005 -0.711*** -0.506 -0.307*** 
 (0.530) (0.086) (0.613) (0.092) (0.620) (0.074) 
N 10986 38725 11020 38642 11151 39222 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses. 
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Appendix 
Table A1: Macro variables data sources 
Variable  Source Year  
Ln GDP per capita 
World Development 
Indicators 2016 2012 
Avg. Oil Export Share  
World Development 
Indicators 2016 
Average Annual share 
2005 to 2014 
Mean years of schooling 
Norris (2015), based on 
UNDP 2014 2014 
Life expectancy at birth 
Norris (2015), based on 
UNDP 2014 2014 
Unemployment (% of total labor 
force) 
Norris (2015), based on 
UNDP 2014 2012 
Control of Corruption  Teorell et al.(2017) 2012 
Colonial Heritage Indicator 
Variables Teorell et al.(2017)  
Level of Democracy (Freedom 
House/Polity) Teorell et al.(2017)  
Predominant Religion Indicator 
Variables Norris (2015)  
Regional Indicator Variables Norris (2015)   
 
 
